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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
William M. Tankovich, Jr., appeals from the judgment of conviction
entered upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty malicious harassment and
conspiracy to commit malicious harassment.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
One afternoon while Ken and Kim Requena were in their garage, they saw
a truck drive by with five people inside. (Tr., p.1754, L.15 - p.1756, L.17; p.1817,
L.8 - p.1818, L.2; p.2032, L.10 - p.2033, L.10.)

Ken, who is Puerto Rican,

noticed the men inside the truck were staring at them and that there was a
swastika drawn in the dirt on the truck. (Tr., p.1752, L.17; p.1756, L.9 - p.1757,
L.7.) On the other side of the truck, also written in dirt, was the phrase, "Born 2
Kill." (Tr., p.1818, Ls.3-15.)
The truck stopped at a nearby stop sign and then backed up to the front of
the Requenas' driveway.

(Tr., p.1757, Ls.9-18; p.1817, Ls.17-19.)

The

Requenas testified that Tankovich's brother, Frank, who was driving the truck,
got out and quickly approached the end of the driveway and said, "Hey, come
over here." (Tr., p.1757, L.24 - p.1758, L.3; p.1760, Ls.13-14.) Tankovich and
his brother, Ira, also got out of the truck.
p.1847, L.24 - p.1849, L.14.)

(Tr., p.1760, L.17 - p.1761, L.11;

Julie Oliver, one of the Requenas' neighbors,

testified that the men were yelling and when she told them to leave, one of them
told her to "shut up." (Tr., p.1819, Ls.1-12.)
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Ken told his wife, Kim, to go inside and call 911 and bring him his gun.
(Tr., p.1758, Ls.13-14.) When Ken got his gun, he cocked it so the Tankoviches
could see it, hoping the gesture would make them leave. (Tr., p.1758, Ls.16-18.)
Although the Tankoviches left, they threatened that they would be back. (Tr.,
p.1759, Ls.17-21; p.1850, Ls.9-18) The police arrived shortly thereafter and took
statements from the Requenas and one of their neighbors. (Tr., p.1761, L.23 p.1762, L.6; p.1821, Ls.5-10; p.1850, Ls.19-24.)
Twenty to thirty minutes later, the Tankoviches made good on their threat
to return.

(Tr., p.1728, Ls.2-6; p.1762, Ls.11-24.)

Frank travelled on foot with a pit bull in tow.

This time, Tankovich and

(Tr., p.1727, Ls.10-17; p.1762,

Ls.20-23.) They came to the end of Ken's driveway and told him he "fucked up."
(Tr., p.1764, Ls.7-10.)

Kim testified that Frank specifically threatened:

"You

fucked with the wrong people. I'm gonna fuck you up." (Tr., p.1852, Ls.12-19.)
At about the same time, Ira approached on foot from another direction; however,
he was intercepted by police who had arrived back on scene after receiving
another 911 dispatch.

(Tr., p.1853, L.2 - p.1855, L.13.)

As the police

approached, Ira threw a gun, which the police recovered. (Tr., p.1766, Ls.14-24;
p.1855, Ls.5-9.) During a subsequent search of Ira, law enforcement discovered
he was also in possession of a knife. (Tr., p.1979, L.21 - p.1980, L.3.)
The police detained Tankovich and Frank. (Tr., p.1768, Ls.5-9.) While
the police were talking to Tankovich and Frank, both men repeatedly called Ken
a "fuckin' beaner" and Tankovich threatened that they would "take care of
business" and take care of the "beaner" themselves.

2

(Tr., p.1769, Ls.4-17;

p.1856, Ls.4-16.) Tankovich also called the officers "pigs." (Tr., p.1911, LS.2425.) The Tankoviches eventually left. (Tr., p.1770, Ls.5-11.)
Although the police did not arrest Tankovich or Frank on the date of the
incident, a grand jury later indicted Tankovich, Frank, and Ira, on one count of
malicious harassment and one count of conspiracy to commit malicious
harassment. 1 (R., Vol. 1, pp.1-3; Vol. 2, pp.241-43; Vol. 3, p.414-16; see Tr.,
p.404, L.12 - p.409, L.3.) The state filed a motion to join all three cases for trial,
which the district court ultimately granted. (R., Vol. 1, pp.35, 55-66, 68-69, 7375.)
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking admission of expert
testimony from Tim Higgins regarding the culture and symbolism of white
supremacists. (R., Vol. 3, pp.482-86.) In particular, the state sought to have Mr.
Higgins testify about the relationship between white supremacy groups and some
of the Tankoviches' tattoos, which included inverted stars with the words "Aryan
Pride" (Tr., p.2078, L.13 - p.2079, L.9; Exhibit 6), the SS "bolts" symbols (Tr.,
p.2079, L.23 - p.2080, L.6; Exhibit 8), and a three-leaf clover, which is a
"traditional Aryan Symbol" (Tr., p.2080, Ls.7-13; Exhibit 9). The court allowed
limited testimony from Mr. Higgins on this issue. (Tr., p.2102, L.4 - p.2121, L.1.)

1 The court later dismissed the malicious harassment charge against Ira finding a
lack of evidence to support the charge, but found sufficient probable cause for
the conspiracy charge against all three defendants. (Tr., p.157, L.21 - p.160,
L.6.)

3

The jury convicted both Tankovich and Frank of malicious harassment and
conspiracy to commit malicious harassment. 2 (R., Vol. 4, p.632; Tr., p.2236, L.15
- p.2237, L.12.) Tankovich filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied.
(R., Vol. 4, pp.634-36, 694-705.) The court subsequently imposed concurrent
unified five-year sentences with two years fixed on both counts, but suspended
the sentences and placed Tankovich on two years of supervised probation. (R.,
Vol. 4, pp.715-18.) Tankovich filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., Vol. 1, ROA,
p.13; Notice of Appeal dated May 10, 2011 (file folder).)

2 The verdicts finding Tankovich guilty occurred at the conclusion of the third jury
trial set in this matter. The first trial ended in a mistrial after the court concluded
inadmissible evidence was presented to the jury. (Trial Tr., pp.439-58.) The
court also declared a mistrial in the second trial as to Tankovich and Frank after
the jury could not reach a verdict as to either defendant; however, the jury in that
trial found Ira guilty of conspiracy to disturb the peace. (Trial Tr., p.1466, L.3 p.1468, L.17.)
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ISSUE
Tankovich states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by permitting Mr. Higgins to testify because
part of his testimony was not relevant and unfairly prejudiced Mr.
Tankovich?
(Appellant's Brief, p.12)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Tankovich failed to establish error in the district court's ruling on the
admissibility of Mr. Higgins' testimony?
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ARGUMENT
Tankovich Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Allowing The Limited Testimony Of Tim Higgins

A.

Introduction
Tankovich claims the district court erred "by permitting [Mr. Higgins] to

testify regarding the meaning of Mr. Tankovich's tattoos because the testimony
suggested that Mr. Tankovich was a member of a gang or had been to prison,
which is both not relevant and unfairly prejudicial."

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

Tankovich is incorrect. To the extent Tankovich's claims are preserved, a review
of the record reveals that Mr. Higgins never testified or "suggested" that
Tankovich "was a member of a gang or had been to prison." Tankovich's claim
of error on this basis, therefore, fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.

State v. Howard, 135

Idaho 727,721,24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001); State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112,
106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005).

C.

Tankovich Has Failed To Establish Error In The Admission Of Mr. Higgins'
Testimony
At trial, the court permitted the state to introduce evidence that (1)

Tankovich's brother Ira has tattoos on his calves of inverted stars with the words
"Aryan Pride" (Tr., p.2025, Ls.12-22; Exhibit 6); and (2) Tankovich has a tattoo of
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the SS "bolts" symbols on his inner arm (Tr., p.2026, L.14 - p. 2027, L.6; p.2136,
L.1 - p.2137, L.11; Exhibit 8), and a tattoo on his chest of a three-leaf clover,
which is "common symbol worn by Aryan white supremacists" (Tr., p.2028, L.15
- p.2029, L.3; p.2137, L.12 - p.2139, L.13; Exhibit 9).3 The court also granted
the state's request to call Tim Higgins in order to explain the significance of the
Tankoviches' tattoos.4

In order to ensure the necessary foundation could be

established for Mr. Higgins' testimony, the court conducted a hearing outside the
presence of the jury.

(Tr., pp.2062-2121.)

During that hearing, Mr. Higgins

testified that he "provide[s] administrative oversight for three programs statewide
with the Department of Corrections both in probation and parole and in the prison
system." (Tr., p.2064, Ls.8-12.) The three programs include "the investigations
program," "the criminal intelligence program," and "the security threat group
management program."

(Tr., p.2064, Ls.13-16.)

Mr. Higgins explained that

"security threat groups" could mean criminal gang members, extremist groups,
militia groups, white supremacist organizations, and "various other groups that
would tend to be problematic inside a prison setting." (Tr., p.2067, Ls.4-8.) Mr.

3 The state offered the tattoo evidence as probative of the Tankoviches' motive
and intent in interacting with Ken Requena. (Tr., p.78-79, 84.) It appears the
court held a hearing on this issue on August 10, 2010 (see R., Vol. 1, ROA at
p.10, 8/11/2010 entry); however, the transcript of that hearing is not included in
the record. The only transcript of proceedings on August 10, 2010, relates to Ira
Tankovich's sentencing. (See Tr., Table of Contents and pp.1474-1509.) Based
on what can be gleaned from the court's comments at later proceedings, the
court concluded the evidence was admissible on the issue of intent. (See Tr.,
p.1519, Ls.17-25; p.2102, L.9-p.2103, L.12.)
4 Indeed, the court suggested the state needed to call an expert on this issue
(Tr., p.79-80) and one of Tankovich's initial objections to the tattoo evidence
before the state designated an expert was the lack of "foundation ... as to what
these tattoos mean" (Tr., p.66, Ls.5-8).
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Higgins also explained how the Tankoviches' tattoos were representative of
those worn by members of Aryan neo-Nazi groups or "gangs." (Tr., pp.20762093.)
Following the voir dire examination of Mr. Higgins, Tankovich advised the
court:
[M]y biggest concern is that letting this witness testify, all it's going
to do is attempt to inflame the jury and say that these people are
part of a gang. He has testified that that's only [sic] his expertise is
in identifying if people are part of a gang or a security threat or
whatever nonsense they're calling it these days, and he has given
you no information that he is at all experienced in just testifying
about relevant sorts of symbols. He has no doctorate, no degree in
history. When discussing these symbols, he says that he hasn't
studied the other uses of them.
And more importantly, your Honor, it seems clear to me that
what the State's hoping to do is have this witness testify and say
these people are part of a gang. That's the only purpose of this
testimony, even if he doesn't say it.
(Tr., p.2096, Ls.4-21.)

Tankovich further argued that allowing Mr. Higgins to

testify ran the "risk of letting the jury assume that they're in a gang when there's
absolutely no evidence of that in this case." (Tr., p.2097, Ls.18-22.)
The state responded:
Your Honor, with regards to the potential risk that counsel is
referring to, I think that that's something that we have begun to
address, certainly, in terms of the nature of the testimony that we'd
be presenting to talk about things in terms of risk groups and rather
than gangs and try to address some of the concerns the Court has.
We wouldn't be seeking from this witness to testify about
these particular defendants and their beliefs, rather, it's specialized
testimony that this individual has based on years of experience and
training relating to his knowledge of gangs and risk groups that is a
part of his everyday work and has been a part of his everyday work
for his entire career as a corrections officer.
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(Tr., p.2100, Ls.9-24.)
The district court noted "the foundation that Mr. Higgins has laid here in
the preliminary examination could be highly prejudicial in terms of exceeding the
boundaries of what it is that would be relevant" since the Tankoviches were "not
on trial for being members of a gang." (Tr., p.2105, Ls.4-13.) Nevertheless, the
court noted the need for expert testimony on the symbolism of the tattoos, which
would be a "legitimate purpose of Mr. Higgins's testimony." (Tr., p.2108, L.13 p.2109, L.8.) Balancing the potential prejudice that could result from Mr. Higgins'
foundational testimony against the need for his expertise, the court ruled that his
testimony
should not be presented in any way to infer or to imply that [the
Tankoviches] had ever been in prison before or that any of these
individuals were necessarily current members of any gangs or any
gang affiliation or any of those things that Mr. Higgins is primarily
entrusted to do in his everyday job.
(Tr., p.2109, Ls.18-25.)

Accordingly, the court cautioned the state to avoid

extensive inquiry into Mr. Higgins' background working for the Department of
Correction in order to prevent any inference that the defendants "had been in
prison or that they were members of specific gangs." (Tr., p.2113, Ls.3-14.) The
court further clarified that Mr. Higgins could testify about his "general title" and
"duties" and suggested that the prosecutor show Mr. Higgins the photographs of
the tattoos, ask him about his familiarity and knowledge of them (Tr., p.2113,
Ls.15-23), but that Mr. Higgins should not "characterize these tattoos as being

9

associated with gang members" (Tr., p.2120, Ls.12-15). 5

Consistent with the

court's ruling, Mr. Higgins never used the word "gang" in his testimony, and,
contrary to Tankovich's claim on appeal (Appellant's Brief, p.13), Mr. Higgins did
not testify or even suggest that Tankovich was ever in prison or in a gang (see
generally Tr., pp.2127-29, 2135-2140).
As required by the district court's ruling, Mr. Higgins' testimony regarding
his experience was very limited. Mr. Higgins testified that he works at the Idaho
Department of Correction as the "investigative and intelligence program director"
and that, as part of his duties, he identifies and categorizes symbols and tattoos
in relation to the Department of Correction's "population" (Tr., p.2128, Ls.1-10);
both of these areas were proper under the court's order (Tr., p.2113, Ls.15-17).
In discussing the symbolism behind the lightning bolts tattoo, Mr. Higgins
testified, without objection, that he had "seen this specific symbol, as part of [his]
duties," approximately "100 times in the last year." (Tr., p.2136, L.1 - p.2137,
L.3.) As to that same tattoo, Mr. Higgins further testified, again without objection,
that he had "seen symbols of this tattoo on people associated with Aryan neoNazi belief systems or white supremacy belief systems." (Tr., p.2137, Ls.9-11.)
On appeal, Tankovich cites the foregoing testimony and argues that "his
association with a gang was not [relevant], nor was the frequency with which Mr.
Higgins saw this tattoo in the prison system." (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Mr.

5 To be clear, although the court ruled that Mr. Higgins should not "characterize
these tattoos as being associated with gang members" (Tr., p.2120, Ls.13-15),
Mr. Higgins was not prohibited from "mention[ing] gang activity because that [is]
part of Mr. Higgins's work through the Department of Corrections" (Tr., p.2120,
L.23 - p.2121, L.1).
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Higgins did not, however, testify that Tankovich had an association with a gang;
rather, his testimony was that the lightning bolt tattoo was associated with a
particular belief system. Moreover, Tankovich never objected to this particular
testimony as irrelevant, nor was his preliminary objection to Mr. Higgins'
testimony based upon the relevance of Tankovich's "association with a gang,"
but was based on an alleged lack of experience with symbols and the risk of
unfair prejudice. 6

(Tr., p.2096, Ls.4-21; p.2097, Ls.18-22.)

Tan kovich 's

objections on these bases is insufficient to "preserve a separate and different
basis for excluding the evidence." State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885,
119 P.3d 653,660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875,880,11
P.3d 494,499 (Ct. App. 2000)).
Tankovich also complains about Mr. Higgins' testimony that three-leaf
clover tattoos are "common symbols worn by Aryan white supremacists inside."
(Appellant's Brief, p.14 (quoting Tr., p.2139, Ls.12-13).) Tankovich argues that
use of the word "inside" was not "relevant" because, he claims, it left the jury
"with the impression that the tattoo was a prison tattoo, and the unmistakable
inference the jury would draw was that Mr. Tankovich had been to prison."
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Although Tankovich objected to and moved to "strike
th[e] last part of the answer," which the court overruled, he did not state a basis
for the objection. (Tr., p.2139, Ls.14-17.) Because Tankovich's objections to Mr.
Higgins' testimony were based on Mr. Higgins' experience and the concern for

Tankovich also did not object to this testimony on the basis that it was beyond
the scope of the court's ruling. To the extent he is complaining on appeal that it
was, any such claim is not preserved.
6
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prejudice, and because he stated no other basis for his specific objection at the
time Mr. Higgins testified, this Court should decline to consider Tankovich's
argument that Mr. Higgins' use of the word "inside" was irrelevant.
Even if the Court entertains Tankovich's relevance argument, it is difficult
to understand how the use of a single word in a witness's testimony can be
subject to a relevance analysis. The gist of Mr. Higgins' challenged statement
was that the three-leaf-clover is a symbol worn by Aryan white supremacists.
This was relevant testimony. That Mr. Higgins' testimony incorporated reference
to his experience with those on the "inside" does not make the testimony any less
relevant even if he "could simply have testified to his understanding of the tattoo
without" using the word "inside". (Appellant's Brief, p.14.)
In addition to his relevance argument, Tankovich asserts Mr. Higgins'
testimony was "unfairly prejudicial." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This argument, like
Tankovich's relevance argument, is premised on an incorrect characterization of
Mr. Higgins' testimony as "suggesting" that Tankovich "was part of a white
supremacist gang or had been in prison."

(Appellant's Brief, p.15.)

While

"[e]vidence of a person's incarceration is prejudicial" (Appellant's Brief, p.15), Mr.
Higgins never testified that Tankovich was, in fact, in prison nor did he imply as
much. Just because Mr. Higgins' experience arises from his interaction with the
prison population does not mean that his knowledge about tattoos only applies to
people who are in prison and he certainly never testified that only prisoners have
such tattoos or that such tattoos can only be obtained while in prison; indeed,
such a proposition would be absurd given the safe assumption that there are no
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tattoo parlors in prison. Tankovich's associated claim that Mr. Higgins implied he
was in a "gang" fails because Mr. Higgins never used the word "gang," much less
suggested that Tankovich was involved in one.
To the extent Tankovich preserved his relevance and prejudice arguments
related to the specific portions of Mr. Higgins' testimony he challenges on appeal,
he has failed to show error.

D.

Even If This Court Finds Some Error Associated With Mr. Higgins'
Testimony. Any Error Was Harmless
Even if this Court finds some error associated with Mr. Higgins' testimony

about which Tankovich complains, any error does not require reversal.
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52.
"The [harmless error] inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational
jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the
challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,669,227 P.3d 918, 923
(2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
There is no dispute that Tankovich called Ken Requena a "beaner." (See
Tr., p.2190, Ls.16-25 (counsel, in closing, arguing there was no "dispute" that the
"Tankoviches made ignorant statements" about Ken Requena in calling him a
"beaner"); Exhibit 10 (transcript of 911 call, which was admitted as Defendant's
Exhibit D, wherein caller says "a beaner pulled a gun on him").)
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Tankovich

acknowledged as much (id.), but argued that his actions were the result of Ken
pulling a gun on him when he allegedly just wanted to buy some wire from Ken,
and were not the product of any racial animus (see generally Tr., pp.2187-97).
There was, however, significant evidence contradicting this defense.
In addition to Requenas' testimony about the Tankoviches behavior
preceding the first interaction and Ken Requena's denial that the only thing he
recalled hearing was Frank saying, "Come over here" (Tr., p.1779, Ls.5-12), the
Requenas' neighbor, Julie Oliver, testified that one of the Tankoviches told her to
"shut up," corroborating the Requenas' claim that the Tankoviches were
behaving aggressively.

(Tr., p.1819, Ls.1-12.)

There was also substantial

evidence of the Tankoviches' racist intent, which included the swastika and the
"Born 2 Kill" inscriptions on their truck, Ira's "Aryan Pride" tattoos (Exhibit 6),
which were not addressed by Mr. Higgins' testimon/, and the Tankoviches'
repeated use of the word "beaner" in referring to Ken Requena.
Ultimately, this case was about whether the jury believed the Requenas
and their neighbors or the Tankoviches with their swastika, their racially-charged
tattoos, and their undisputed use of the word "beaner." The jury's verdicts reflect
how they resolved the discrepancies between the two versions of events. This
case was not about, and did not hinge, on some speculative inference that
Tankovich "was a member of a gang and/or had been in prison.,,8 (Appellant's

7 The court did not allow Mr. Higgins to testify about Ira's tattoos, concluding
those "tattoos on his calves speak for themselves." (Tr., p.2111, Ls.7-14.)

8 It is also worth noting that, at the conclusion of Mr. Higgins' testimony,
Tankovich requested a "limiting instruction informing the jury that they are to take
14

Brief, p.17.) Thus, to the extent the Court agrees with Tankovich's claims of
relevance or prejudice in relation to Mr. Higgins' testimony, any error in that
regard is harmless and does not require reversal of Tankovich's convictions.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Tankovich's
convictions for malicious harassment and conspiracy to commit malicious
harassment.
DATED this 20 th day of July, 2012

orney General

no inference that either of the Tankoviches are involved with any of those
organizations [referred to by Mr. Higgins]." (Tr., p.2149, Ls.3-6.) The court
stated it would defer ruling on that request until the instruction conference
following the presentation of evidence. (Tr., p.2149, Ls.9-11.) After the
presentation of evidence, the court excused the jury and indicated the parties
were "going to meet ... and continue to work on [the] instructions." (Tr., p.2166,
Ls.18-22.) That "meeting" is not transcribed. The following day, the court noted
the final instructions had been prepared and inquired as to whether there was
"any objection to the giving of any instruction or to the refusal to give any
particular instruction." (Tr., p.2168, L.21 - p.2169, L.1.) Tankovich responded:
"my previous objections to the conspiracy instruction, I don't have any further,
your Honor." (Tr., p.2169, Ls.2-4.) Thus, there is no indication in the record that
Tankovich asked the court for a ruling on a limiting instruction in relation to Mr.
Higgins' testimony, much less that the court denied such a request. If Tankovich
abandoned his request in favor of raising the issue on appeal, that would seem to
constitute the sort of sandbagging disfavored by courts. See State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) ("[R]equiring a contemporaneous
objection prevents the litigant from sandbagging the court, i.e., remaining silent
about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not
conclude in his favor.") (citation and quotations omitted).
15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20 th day of July 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

orney General
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